Refining Technology Threat Avoidance Theory by Carpenter, D. et al.
Trinity University
Digital Commons @ Trinity
School of Business Faculty Research School of Business
2019
Refining Technology Threat Avoidance Theory
D. Carpenter
Diana K. Young
Trinity University, dyoung1@trinity.edu
P. Barrett
A. J. McLeod
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/busadmin_faculty
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Business at Digital Commons @ Trinity. It has been accepted for inclusion in
School of Business Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact
jcostanz@trinity.edu.
Repository Citation
Carpenter, D., Young, D.K., Barrett, P., & McLeod, A.J. (2019). Refining technology threat avoidance theory. Communications of the
Association for Information Systems, 44. doi: 10.17705/1CAIS.04422
Communications of the Association for Information Systems
Volume 44 Article 22
3-2019
Refining Technology Threat Avoidance Theory
Darrell Carpenter
Longwood University, carpenterdr@longwood.edu
Diana K. Young
Trinity University
Paul Barrett
Longwood University
Alexander J. McLeod
Texas State University San Marcos
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais
This material is brought to you by the AIS Journals at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in Communications of the
Association for Information Systems by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Carpenter, D., Young, D. K., Barrett, P., & McLeod, A. J. (2019). Refining Technology Threat Avoidance Theory. Communications of
the Association for Information Systems, 44, pp-pp. https://doi.org/10.17705/1CAIS.04422
 C ommunications of the 
A I S  ssociation for nformation ystems 
    
 
Research Paper DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.04422 ISSN: 1529-3181 
Volume 44  Paper 22  pp. 380 – 407  March 2019 
 
 
Refining Technology Threat Avoidance Theory 
Darrell Carpenter 
College of Business and Economics 
Longwood University 
carpenterdr@longwood.edu 
Diana K. Young 
Finance and Decision Science 
Trinity University 
 
Paul Barrett 
College of Business and Economics 
Longwood University 
 
Alexander J. McLeod 
Health Information Management 
Texas State University San Marcos 
Abstract: 
Understanding individual threat avoidance motivation and behavior is a critical component in designing effective cyber
security solutions for both users and organizations. Technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT) asserts that individuals’
perceptions regarding their susceptibility to and the resulting severity of technology threats influence their awareness
of the threats, which, in turn, influences their motivation and behavior to avoid them. While TTAT provides cogently and
logically explains individuals’ technology threat motivations and behaviors, empirical tests have produced equivocal
results particularly in terms of the influence of susceptibility and severity on threat perceptions. Due to these
inconsistencies in the threat calculus involving susceptibility, severity, and threat, we need more work to improve and
understand individual threat motivations. Additionally, TTAT does not account for individual differences such as risk
propensity, distrust propensity, and impulsivity that have been shown to affect cyber security behavior. To address these
gaps, we present an empirical assessment of a refined TTAT model, which includes individual differences and models
the influence of susceptibility on threat perceptions as partially mediated by severity. Results indicate that, while
perceived susceptibility is a significant predictor of threat perceptions, severity perceptions partially mediates its effect.
Our results also support the inclusion of risk propensity and distrust propensity in the TTAT model as personal
characteristics that significantly affect overall threat perceptions. 
Keywords: Individual Behaviors, Empirical, Psychological Theory, Survey, Security. 
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1 Introduction 
Understanding individual threat avoidance motivation and behavior represents a critical component in 
designing effective cyber security solutions for both users and organizations. In 2009, the United States 
National Security Agencies’ Information Security Director, Richard Schaeffer, stated that, if individuals 
simply implemented known best practices, regularly monitored network activity, and applied proper 
configuration policies, both they and their organizations could avoid over 80 percent of cyber incidents 
(Zetter, 2009). The cyber security landscape today remains remarkably similar. For example, the Online 
Trust Alliance (OTA) recently reported that 91 percent of the 2016 cyber incidents it analyzed were 
preventable and noted that most resulted from unpatched software, misconfigured devices, unencrypted 
data, employee errors, hazardous links, or obsolete technology (Spiezle & Wilbur, 2017). Further, the Open 
Web Application Security Project recently added “insufficient attack detection and prevention” to its list of 
the ten most critical security risks (OWASP, 2017) to recognize the pervasive failure of individuals and 
organizations to implement well-known security measures that detect and prevent many types of attacks 
(Williams, 2017). 
The 2016 Democratic National Committee (DNC) email server incident clearly exemplifies the failure to 
implement established best security practices (Lipton, Sanger, & Shane, 2016). Despite being a critical 
component of the United States electoral system, the DNC failed to adequately assess its susceptibility to 
cyber compromise and failed to implement the most basic detective and preventative security controls. This 
decision rendered DNC IT staff members unable to identify a suspect device when the FBI notified them 
that a compromise had occurred. Accordingly, the DNC did not take the FBI warning seriously, and nearly 
seven months passed before it initiated an incident response. During that time, multiple employees, 
including John Podesta, the chairman of Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, received phishing emails 
and inappropriately clicked on links in those messages that allowed hackers to access the trove of emails 
that WikiLeaks (2016) later released. Clearly, had DNC leaders conducted a more thorough risk 
assessment, proactively adopted robust network-monitoring tools, and implemented a more aggressive 
user-training program, they might have mitigated the impact of the incident.  
The fact that preventable cyber incidents continue to occur raises the question of why individuals do not do 
more to avoid security threats. In an effort to answer this question, Liang and Xue (2009) proposed the 
technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT), which asserts that individuals’ perceptions about their 
susceptibility to and the resulting severity of technology threats influence their awareness of the threats 
(known as the threat calculus). This threat calculus, in turn, influences their motivation and behavior toward 
avoiding them. While TTAT cogently and logically explains individuals’ technology threat motivations and 
behaviors, empirical tests have produced inconsistent results (Arachchilage & Love, 2014; Manzano, 2012; 
Young, Carpenter, & McLeod, 2016). As for why, one potential explanation might lie in an inaccuracy in the 
specified relationship between susceptibility and severity as antecedents of the overall threat perception. 
Liang and Xue (2010) modeled threat susceptibility and threat severity as having both direct and an 
interactive effect on avoidance motivation. However, in reviewing empirical studies in this domain, we found 
that the relationships between susceptibility, severity, and threat perceptions appear significant in some 
studies and insignificant in others (Manzano, 2012; Vance, Anderson, Kirwan, & Earle, 2014).  
Further, we argue that TTAT fails to consider important individual differences when assessing avoidance 
motivation. Prior literature has shown that individuals’ propensities relating to risk, impulsivity, and distrust 
influence their perceptions and decision making processes (Churchill & Jessop, 2010; Hung & Tangpong, 
2010). Because research has shown such perceptions and decision-making processes to be central to 
behavioral motivation in other contexts, we argue that these three personal traits will likely have significant 
impacts on the model’s dependent variables and, thus, that one should consider them as important 
predictors. We believe that incorporating these individual differences into the TTAT model would allow it to 
explain technology threat avoidance motivations and behaviors with more nuance. Accordingly, with this 
research, we examine the following research questions (RQ):  
RQ1: Do perceptions about susceptibility influence both perceived severity and perceived threat and, 
thereby, affect individuals’ avoidance motivations and behaviors? 
RQ2: Do individual differences such as risk propensity, impulsivity, and distrust propensity influence 
individuals’ technology threat motivations and behaviors? 
To answer these questions, we employed a survey research method and structural equation modeling to 
test a revised TTAT model using a sample of 685 registered Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. Our results 
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support the revised model in which severity partially mediated susceptibility’s influence on threat 
perceptions. Additionally, we found support for including risk propensity, impulsivity, and distrust in the 
revised model. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the existing literature on TTAT, impulsivity, risk 
propensity, and distrust propensity. In Section 3, we use these prior works to develop our research model 
and hypotheses. In Section 4, we outline our research method, data collection, and analysis processes. In 
Section 5, we discuss our results. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss the study’s limitations, make suggestions 
for future research, and conclude the paper. 
2 Literature Review  
2.1 Technology Threat Avoidance Theory 
In the information technology (IT) realm, TTAT (Liang & Xue, 2009) suggests that the way that users 
perceive a threat influences their motivation to invoke a safeguarding mechanism against it. Liang and Xue 
(2010) tested their theory verifying the theoretical underpinnings and offering their model to explain 
technology threat avoidance behavior. The original model includes perceptions of susceptibility, severity, 
threat, safeguard effectiveness, safeguard costs, self-efficacy, avoidance motivation, and avoidance 
behavior. A Google Scholar search of previous literature for “technology threat avoidance theory” yielded 
88 results (including the two original works). Examining these studies, we found a variety of methods, 
contexts, and usage. Figure 1 represents the original Liang and Xue (2010) model. 
 
Figure 1. Technology Threat Avoidance Model (Liang & Xue, 2010 
Perceived susceptibility refers to an individual’s subjective belief that malicious technology will likely affect 
their devices and systems. Similarly, perceived severity refers to an individual’s subjective belief regarding 
the damage that malicious technology could inflict on their devices and systems. These perceptions both 
independently and together influence an individual’s beliefs regarding a threat’s magnitude. That magnitude, 
along with beliefs regarding the efficacy, costs (time, effort, and money), and ease of implementing a threat 
safeguard influence one’s motivation to avoid the malicious technology, which, in turn, influences one’s 
avoidance behavior.  
Analyzing this research stream provided great insight into TTAT and its explanatory value. In originally 
testing TTAT, Liang and Xue (2010) found that all associations were significant except the interaction 
between severity and susceptibility. While theory supports these relationships, we found the lack of 
significance in the interactions surprising and, thus, questioned and reviewed the threat, severity, and 
susceptibility literature. Several prior studies have tested the full TTAT model, which includes the interaction 
between susceptibility and severity with differing outcomes (Arachchilage & Love, 2014; Chen & Zahedi, 
2016; Manzano, 2012; Young et al., 2016). Manzano (2012) examined the association between 
susceptibility and threat across two groups: 49 employees at a local beverage company and 32 information 
technology professionals. They found a significant relationship between susceptibility and threat for local 
beverage company group but not for the information technology group. Neither the interaction of 
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susceptibility with severity nor the association of severity with threat was significant depending on which 
group was under consideration. Arachchilage and Love (2014) found that all associations were significant. 
Young et al. (2016) found that severity significantly related to threat but that neither susceptibility to threat 
nor the interaction of severity and susceptibility on threat was significant. Chen and Zahedi (2016) reported 
the associations of susceptibility and severity significantly related to threat but did not test the interaction of 
susceptibility and severity. Finally, Bujang and Hussin (2012) suggested a modified full model that did not 
contain the interaction between susceptibility and severity hypothesized in the Liang and Xu (2009) original 
TTAT model. However, Bujang and Hussin did not empirically test their newly proposed model. 
Recently, Boysen et al. (2017) suggest a change in the threat assessment portion of TTAT in theorizing that 
susceptibility is an antecedent to severity in the threat calculus (see Figure 2). They tested this theory using 
the full Liang and Xu (2010) TTAT model. Results indicate significance for all relationships in the threat 
calculus requiring further examination of this theoretical shift. A brief example may be useful in 
understanding the argument for a change in current theoretical perspective. Consider Stuxnet, a piece of 
malware designed specifically to infect a particular type of nuclear centrifuge (Langner, 2011). Computer 
users concerned about Stuxnet will quickly determine that it only affects certain nuclear centrifuges but that 
the damage done to those centrifuges can be catastrophic when such systems are infected. Despite its 
potential for disastrous consequences, typical computer users may not perceive Stuxnet as a severe threat 
because it is unlikely to affect them. Thus, their perception of low susceptibility directly influences their 
perception of threat severity. Essentially, a perception of moderate susceptibility becomes a necessary 
precursor to a perception of severity in the explicit context of threat avoidance motivation and behavior. We 
do not argue that this phenomenon holds in contexts other than threat avoidance motivation. For example, 
a subject responding to a survey on Stuxnet may indicate that it is, in general terms, a severe threat. 
However, that same subject may perceive Stuxnet as a low threat to themselves, a perspective that informs 
their overall severity assessment and ultimately their threat calculus, and avoidance motivation. To 
summarize, several researchers have incorporated the full TTAT model in their work to explain the 
associations between susceptibility, severity, and threat but found mixed results, which indicates that we 
may need an alternate explanation. 
 
Figure 2. Susceptibility as an Antecedent to Severity (Boysen, McLeod, & Hewitt, 2017) 
Some researchers have considered a partial model of TTAT in their research. Rho and Yu (2011) proposed 
a relationship between susceptibility, severity, and threat and an interaction between susceptibility and 
severity in a larger theoretically combined model. However, they did not test the proposed model. 
Mwagwabi, McGill, and Dixon (2014) examined a partial TTAT model and reported significant relationships 
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between susceptibility and threat and between severity and threat but did not test the interaction between 
susceptibility and severity. Couraud (2014) invoked a partial model in extending TTAT using risk sensitivity. 
In this work, severity significantly influenced susceptibility but did not significantly affect self-efficacy. Vance 
et al. (2014) also tested a partial model. They examined the associations between risk, severity, 
susceptibility and threat in a “security warning” scenario. They found no significant changes in pretest or 
post-test for susceptibility but mixed results for severity. Zahedi, Abbas, and Chen (2015) incorporated 
susceptibility and severity as part of a threat appraisal study but found marginal and mixed results. They did 
not test the interaction between susceptibility and severity. Browne, Lang, and Golden (2015) used most of 
the TTAT constructs to create a new security adoption model but did not empirically test their conceptual 
model. Finally, other empirical and conceptual development studies have used costs and intention 
constructs when citing TTAT without including susceptibility, severity, and threat. Table 1 overviews TTAT 
papers that incorporate severity, susceptibility, and threat perceptions. 
Table 1. Summary of TTAT Studies that Examine Severity, Susceptibility, or Threat Perceptions 
Paper Notes Susceptibility Sus. x Sev. Severity Threat 
Liang & Xue (2010) Original TTAT theoretical test. Sig. N.s. Sig. Sig. 
Manzano (2012) 
Voluntary working participants 
comprised experimental group and 
control group of IT professional 
participants. 
Mixed between 
groups N.s. 
Mixed 
between 
groups 
Mixed 
between 
groups 
Arachchilage & 
Love (2013) 
Changed context to game-based 
phishing attacks. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. 
Young et al. (2016) 
Replicates TTAT theoretical test. 
Broadened context to malware (vs. 
spyware). 
N.s. N.s. Sig. Sig. 
Chen & Zahedi 
(2016) 
Examines the online threat 
avoidance context and focuses on 
determining which behaviors and 
perceptions apply to Western vs. 
Eastern cultures. 
Sig. 0 Sig. Sig. 
Mwagwabi (2015) 
Extends TTAT to include exposure 
to hacking as a predictor of 
perceived vulnerability. 
Sig. 0 Sig. Sig. 
Vance et al. (2014) 
Uses partial TTAT model 
examining users’ perceptions of 
risk, severity, susceptibility, and 
threat. 
N.s. 0 N.s. 0 
Zahedi et al (2015) 
Only uses severity and 
susceptibility as part of threat 
appraisal. 
Mixed 0 Mixed 0 
Xue et al. (2015) Uses TAM intention and behavior. Not really TTAT. Sig. 0 0 0 
To summarize, TTAT has provided the foundation for many studies, and researchers have used it in various 
ways. Most researchers have chosen to adopt only pieces of the model; as such, few have tested it 
completely. Further, research has found mixed results for the relationships between severity, susceptibility, 
and threat, which indicates that additional work needs to refine and improve the theory. Some researchers 
have tested additional variables associated with risk, impulsivity, and trust independently. Thus, these 
variables require further examination using the full TTAT model. 
2.2 Impulsivity  
Impulsivity is a complicated, multifaceted concept that refers to an individual’s propensity to make decisions 
without thinking about future consequences (Cloninger, Przybeck, & Svrakic, 1991; Eysenck & Eysenck, 
1985). Behavioral impulsivity incorporates two distinct factors: impulsive decision making and impulsive 
activity (Broos et al., 2012; De Wit, 2009; Perry & Carroll, 2008). Numerous studies have begun to examine 
the neuroscience of inhibition, which they describe as hesitant and limited behavior (Bari & Robbins, 2013; 
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Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011), and impulsivity, which they describe as a propensity to make decision 
without thinking about future consequences (Cloninger et al., 1991; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). These 
works attempt to improve our understanding of the interplay between neurobiology, personality, and 
situational impacts on impulsive conduct.  
Prior research has found associations between emotional studies and impulsivity (Abrantes et al., 2008). 
For example, individuals who experience a negative or distressful situation may be more likely to make 
decisions that ignore impulse control (Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001). As these researchers point 
out, when upset, people will often indulge impulsive desires in order to make themselves feel better. Emotion 
regulation is a learned process that research has linked to impulsivity (Schreiber, Grant, & Odlaug, 2012) 
because it can empower individuals to manage their emotion states to attain beneficial outcomes and, 
consequently, avoid negative outcomes. Conversely, research has associated the absence of emotion 
regulation (i.e., emotion dysregulation) with increased impulsivity (Granö, Virtanen, Vahtera, Elovainio, & 
Kivimäki, 2004).  
Impulsivity has the potential to interrupt planning strategies (Churchill & Jessop, 2010; Schweizer, 2002) 
and, thus, trigger potential risks to individuals, groups, and organizational systems. One can assess it by 
ascertaining decision making in realistic and speculative situations (Brandstätter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 
2001). Further, broad evidence shows that a relationship exists between impulsive processes, which 
research refers to as automatic action tendencies and overt avoidance tendencies (Amir, Kuckertz, & Najmi, 
2013). These impulsive processes are habits that play an important role in maintaining approach or 
avoidance behaviors.  
In the IS literature, research has shown impulsivity to significantly predict online purchasing habits (Zhang, 
Prybutok, & Strutton, 2007). Research has theoretically linked it to violations of security practices as a 
component of general deterrence theory, which regards impulsive actions as a lack of self-control (D’Arcy 
& Hovav, 2004; D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007; Siponen, Pahnila, 
& Mahmood, 2007). Much of the basis for these theorized relationships comes from the criminology 
literature, which suggests impulsive people focus on the present and often fail to consider the consequences 
that their actions may have (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). Indeed, work in the psychology that has found 
significant relationships between various forms of impulsivity and narcissism/psychopathy bolsters this 
characterization (Jones & Paulhus, 2011). Researchers have also modeled impulsivity as a personality trait 
in security policy compliance decisions and as subject to social control (Cheng, Li, Li, Holm, & Zhai, 2013). 
However, we know about no empirical study that has examined these theorized links between impulsiveness 
and security behavior. Understanding the effects of individual impulsivity propensities may elicit insights 
related to productive and counter-productive threat avoidance behavior in individuals and, thus, play a role 
in TTAT. In this study, we model impulsivity as an antecedent to avoidance motivation that may influence 
an individual’s decision to take risky actions when faced with a known security threat. 
2.2.1 Risk Propensity 
Risk propensity refers to an individual’s cumulative tendency to engage in or avoid risk (Pablo, 1997; Sitkin 
& Pablo, 1992; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995) and both persists and evolves with experience (Hung, Tangpong, 
Li, & Li, 2012). Risk propensity constitutes an important trait to understand when setting policy for decision 
making (Hung & Tangpong, 2010) and, when left out, can result in policies that present challenges in 
practice (Bendoly, Donohue, & Schultz, 2006). Decision making related to IT threats, such as general 
business decisions, has multiple facets, such as combinations of risks in political, financial, operational, and 
social domains, which feature inherently high ambiguity. Researchers consider risk propensity and 
ambiguity tolerance to be positively correlated (Lauriola & Levin, 2001) and to have a combined influence 
on decision making (Hung & Tangpong, 2010). For example, Ghosh (1994) found that ambiguity tolerance 
had a moderating effect on risk propensity for effectiveness in negotiations.  
Risk propensity operates in the decision-making sphere. Researchers generally accept that three main 
components impact the decision-making process: decision features, individual differences, and situational 
factors (Einhorn, 1970). The focus on individual differences as an explanatory construct took a step forward 
in research related to risk aversion in business and finance (Weber, 2001). Studies began to examine risk 
attitude as an individual difference in a framework of the perceived risk and return in decisions (Weber, 
Blais, & Betz, 2002). One could certainly argue that risk attitude and risk propensity share similarities and 
make up part of decision style, and researchers have tested different measures that support that assertion 
(Mohammed & Schwall, 2009). Overall, individual difference underscores potential effects on judgment and 
decision making (Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf, & Weber, 2011), and one can assess that effect by determining 
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actual choices in both realistic and hypothetical scenarios (Levin, Weller, Pederson, & Harshman, 2007). In 
the same vein, Jackson, Hourany, and Vidmar (1972) created the risk-taking propensity questionnaire, a 
self-report instrument, to elicit perceptions of risks and benefits to ascertain desirable risk levels in 
individuals.  
Researchers have recognized risk propensity as an important antecedent to security threat perceptions and 
avoidance behaviors (Moody, Galletta, Walker, & Dunn, 2011; Nguyen & Kim, 2017; Sun & Ahluwalia, 2008; 
Vance et al., 2014). Nguyen and Kim (2017) studied the level of association between 244 university 
students’ risk propensities and their information-avoidance behaviors. They found significant associations 
between individuals’ risk propensities and their threat perceptions and behaviors. Finally, Vance et al. (2014) 
used electroencephalography (EEG) technology to better understand how individuals perceived and 
responded to information security risks. They found that risk propensity could effectively predict whether or 
not individuals would disregard security warnings both before and after incident exposure. Based on these 
findings, it appears that risk propensity may play a role in the TTAT model as an antecedent to avoidance 
motivation. 
2.3 Distrust Propensity 
An individual’s propensity to distrust a technological security solution is rooted in the individual’s prior 
knowledge about unscrupulous behavior or inability to verify the behavior of other actors involved in 
developing, deploying, and maintaining that security solution (McKnight & Choudhury, 2006). Distrust in this 
context does not merely refer to the absence of trust but rather to an active state of anticipating malfeasance, 
incompetence, or insufficient capability by some party involved in creating or maintaining the security 
solution (McKnight & Chervany, 2001). Distrust propensity refers to one actor’s negative perception about 
another’s conduct or potential conduct, while trust refers to one actor’s believing that another will not behave 
opportunistically (Lee, Ahn, & Park, 2015). The actors in a trust relationship generally know one another, 
while distrust propensity involves both known and unknown actors (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). 
Distrust propensity forms when an actor has substantial potential to behave opportunistically without 
detection or explicit means of redress, while actors often build trust relationships on prior experience and 
structural assurances such as contracts that dictate behavioral standards and means of remediating a failure 
to perform as expected (McKnight, Kacmar, & Choudhury, 2003).  
Researchers have demonstrated distrust towards technology to have negative impacts on user adoption in 
many contexts. Hsiao (2003) found both value-oriented and reliability-oriented distrust of technology to 
significantly hinder e-commerce adoption. Sitkin and Roth (1993) modeled value-oriented and reliability-
oriented distrust as two facets of distrust that may affect perceptions toward an organization or product. 
While legal agreements between parties may mitigate reliability-oriented concerns, the availability of legal 
remedies does not diminish such concerns. This phenomenon has particularly importance in the technology 
threat avoidance context since many threat mitigation products contain disclaimers that limit any legal 
remedies that arise from product defects or limitations (Ryan & Heckman, 2003). Similar to Hsiao (2003), 
Benamati and Serva (2007) found that reliance on technology exacerbated distrust between a technology 
provider and consumers in online banking. Lin, Shih, and Sher (2007) adopted a slightly different approach 
by modeling distrust propensity of technology as a component of technology readiness, which they showed 
to substantially increase the explanatory power of technology adoption models in varying contexts. Thus, 
the previous literature strongly supports distrust in technology as a barrier to adoption in the general IT 
context. 
In the more specific security technology context, several researchers have discussed distrust propensity 
due to the potential for abuse of data related to threat deterrent measures. As an example, many 
organizations use robust authentication mechanisms, such as biometric controls, to protect against 
unauthorized access and, thus, avoid threats. Prabhakar, Pankanti, and Jain (2003) posited that one might 
use biometric authentication data to screen for genetic defects among system users without their knowledge 
or consent. However, using authentication data in this unexpected (but technically feasible) way could have 
negative impacts on end users and cause them to distrust the biometric technology itself, the system 
developer, the integrator, or any entity that stores data related to the system. In turn, this distrust could 
serve as a disincentive for organizations to implement this type of threat-avoidance solution. Other 
researchers have described methods of using disparate data sources along with security system data to re-
identify otherwise anonymous individuals (Salvagnini, Bazzani, Cristani, & Murino, 2013; Schumann & 
Monari, 2014). In some cases, such as in analyzing keystrokes as a behavioral biometric, collecting the 
required security system data may lead to privacy risks if exposed (Sun & Upadhyaya, 2015). In this 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 387
 
Volume 44  10.17705/1CAIS.04422 Paper 22
 
example, these risks can occur because the information that such an analysis requires also contains 
sensitive data such as passwords, files accessed, and message data. Recently, public disclosures of 
governmental meddling related to commercial security products have given rise to additional distrust 
sentiment among technology consumers. For example, in December, 2013, a Reuters article cited an 
undisclosed source who claimed that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) paid security firm RSA 
US$10 million dollars to set a known-flawed random number generator as the preferred option in its 
commercial cryptography products (Menn, 2013) in order to ensure that it could decrypt any traffic encrypted 
with the faulty cryptographic cipher algorithms. Further, in 2015, Juniper Networks acknowledged that some 
of their enterprise products contained a cryptographic backdoor that an unknown actor compromised and 
used an existing “backdoor to create an encryption backdoor” (Smith & Green, 2016). Finally, a recent push 
from law enforcement agencies across the world to compel commercial companies to provide help in 
defeating security technologies has exacerbated a climate of distrust among consumers. Law enforcement’s 
aggressive pursuit of cybersecurity backdoors has prompted a group of preeminent cryptographers to 
engage in the debate concerning law enforcement’s access to data secured with various technological 
solutions (Abelson et al., 2015). While these cybersecurity-centric scholars advocate for strong 
cryptographic security solutions without backdoors, no one need heed their advice. The potential for 
collusion between multiple actors, such as governments and product developers, persists, and the 
consequences of a compromised security solution could be catastrophic. The combination of theoretical 
misuses of security technology, revelations of flawed products, and governmental efforts to create 
backdoors in security measures provides a persuasive, if not empirically tested, case for the argument that 
distrust issues impact threat avoidance behavior. 
3 Model and Hypotheses 
In this section, we present our refined TTAT research model (see Figure 3) and develop our research 
hypotheses. 
We believe that perceived susceptibility has both a direct and a mediated effect through perceived severity 
on technology threat perceptions. This rationale rests on the assertion that an individual’s awareness of, 
concern for, or fear of a technology threat will increase when they know they are susceptible to it. 
Additionally, when individuals know that they are susceptible to a given technology threat, they will become 
more concerned about the severity of the consequences that result from that threat. Conversely, when 
individuals know that they are not susceptible to a technology threat, their awareness of, concern for, or fear 
of that threat and the severity of its consequences will decrease. Based on these arguments, we 
hypothesize: 
H1a: Perceived susceptibility positively influences threat perceptions. 
H1b: Perceived severity partially mediates the influence that perceived susceptibility has on threat 
perceptions.  
H1c: Perceived severity positively influences threat perceptions 
Beyond our suggested revisions in modeling the influence that perceived susceptibility and perceived 
severity have on threat perceptions, we adopt and test the remainder of the original TTAT model (Liang & 
Xue, 2010). Accordingly, based on Liang and Xue (2010) and other studies (Manzano, 2012; Arachchilage 
& Love, 2014; Chen & Zahedi, 2016; Young et al., 2016) we hypothesize that: 
H2: Perceived threat positively influences avoidance motivation. 
H3: Safeguard effectiveness perceptions positively influence avoidance motivation. 
H4: Safeguard cost perceptions negatively influence avoidance motivation. 
H5: Self-efficacy about one’s ability to implement a safeguard positively influences avoidance 
motivation. 
H6: Avoidance motivation positively influences avoidance behavior. 
Risk propensity refers to an individual’s tendency to either avoid or engage in risky endeavors (Pablo, 1997). 
We believe that individuals with higher risk tendencies will feel less concerned with technology related 
threats, which will suppress their motivation to avoid those threats. Conversely, we believe that individuals 
with lower risk tendencies will be more concerned about their susceptibility to technology threats and the 
potential negative consequences resulting from those threats. Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
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H7: Risk propensity negatively influences threat perceptions. 
Researchers have defined distrust propensity as negative beliefs regarding another party’s conduct (Lee et 
al., 2015) and demonstrated this distrust to have a negative impact on technology adoption. Since we focus 
on safeguards for avoiding technology threats in this study, we focus on how distrust impacts threat 
perceptions. We believe that the more distrusting an individual, the more concern they will have for a 
technology threat’s potential consequences. Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
H8: Distrust propensity positively influences threat perceptions. 
Impulsivity refers to individuals’ tendency to act with little forethought about the consequences of their 
actions. We believe that impulsivity suppresses motivation to avoid security threats. For example, when 
searching for content online, an impulsive individual would be more likely to download the content from a 
questionable website and lack concern for the fact that the downloaded content may contain a technology 
threat. The individual’s impulsivity to have the desired content causes the individual to not consider the 
threat’s potential consequences. Conversely, a non-impulsive individual would be more likely to thoughtfully 
weigh the threat’s potential consequences and choose to implement a threat safeguard. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that: 
H9: Impulsivity negatively influences avoidance motivations. 
 
Figure 3. Revised TTAT Research Model 
4 Method 
We employed a survey research method and structural equation modeling to test our refined research model 
and hypotheses. We assessed information that 685 registered Amazon Mechanical Turk workers provided. 
We focused our study on these individuals because most prior TTAT studies have focused on students’ 
technology threat perspectives. Amazon Mechanical Turk workers represent a global community of 
individuals who rely on their personal computing devices to earn money. Additionally, the community 
includes individuals who work both full-time and part-time outside of Mechanical Turk, unemployed 
individuals, and students. As such, we felt the community provided a highly heterogeneous group of 
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individuals with strong interests in protecting their computing devices from technology threats. The survey 
instrument included questions regarding respondents’ perceptions of their susceptibility to and the severity 
of the consequences from threats. Below, we outline the measures that we used and the data-collection 
processes that we employed.  
4.1 Measures 
We adopted Liang and Xue’s (2010) previously validated measures to assess all of the TTAT constructs but 
modified them based on our review of the literature. First, we modified several items’ wording to better fit 
the malware context. Additionally, we adjusted the perceived severity measure’s scale to use a seven-point 
Likert scale (anchors: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neutral, 5 = somewhat 
agree, 6 = agree, and 7 = strongly agree). By making this change, we could assess all constructs using a 
consistent seven-point Likert scale rather than a survey with mixed semantic differential and Likert items. 
Finally, we dropped one of the perceived susceptibility items because we felt it focused on future malware 
susceptibility while all others items focused on current susceptibility. The TTAT section of our instrument 
comprised four items to measure perceived susceptibility, 10 items to measure perceived severity, five items 
to measure perceived threat, six items to measure safeguard effectiveness, three items to measure 
safeguard cost, 10 items to measure self-efficacy, three items to measure avoidance motivation, and two 
items to measure avoidance behavior. All of the adopted measures exhibited Cronbach alpha coefficients 
of 0.89 or greater in Liang and Xue’s (2010) study.  
We also drew measures from the existing literature to assess risk propensity, distrust, and impulsivity. We 
adopted Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-O’Creevy, and Willman’s (2005) six-item measure of risk propensity, 
which exhibited a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.80 in their study. We used Ashleigh, Higgs, and 
Dulewicz’s (2012) nine-item measure of distrust, which previously exhibited a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
of 0.86. Finally, we adopted four items from Grasmick, Tittle, Busik, and Arneklev’s (1993) 24-item self-
control scale to assess impulsivity. These authors theorized impulsivity to be one of six self-control 
dimensions. However, factor analysis of the 24 items they used to measure those dimensions resulted in a 
unidimensional factor structure. While all of the impulsivity items loaded significantly on the unidimensional 
factor, the authors did not provide reliability metrics for only that portion of the scale.  
We included all of the selected measures on an electronic survey instrument that contained seven blocks 
of items. The first block contained items to assess malware susceptibility and severity perceptions. The 
second block contained items to assess: 1) malware threat perceptions, 2) beliefs regarding the 
effectiveness of anti-malware software, and 3) cost perceptions regarding implementation of anti-malware 
software. The third block contained items to assess self-efficacy beliefs regarding one’s ability to effectively 
install and use the anti-malware software. The fourth block contained items to measure motivation to adopt 
anti-malware software and actual use of the protective software. The fifth block contained items to measure 
risk propensity. The sixth block contained items to assess impulsivity and distrust. The seventh block 
contained various demographic questions. In each block, we randomized the sequence of items to protect 
against order effects (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Appendix A lists the included items in detail. 
4.2 Data Collection 
The sample frame of interest included individuals at risk of malware infecting their computing devices. While 
a great deal of prior TTAT research has focused on students’ threat avoidance perceptions and behavior 
(Liang & Xue, 2010; Young et al., 2016), we felt that we needed to collect the data for this study from a more 
diverse set of individuals that included both students and adults. Since malware could potentially infect the 
device of any individual who uses the Internet, we sought data from a broad range of ages, employment 
status, and geographical locations. Accordingly, we collected data using Amazon Mechanical Turk, a 
crowdsourcing marketplace.  
Amazon (2008) describes Mechanical Turk as a tool that provides task requesters with “access to a diverse, 
on-demand, scalable workforce and gives workers a selection of thousands of tasks to complete whenever 
it’s convenient”. Using the service, task requesters create self-contained human intelligence tasks (HITs) 
that registered workers can complete to earn monetary rewards. The requester determines the reward size 
and pays it only if satisfied with the submitted work. Amazon facilitates all financial transactions between 
task requesters and registered workers. 
While Amazon does not release statistics regarding the number of registered Mechanical Turk workers, 
estimates have suggested that the platform has between 200,000 (Ross, Irani, Six, Zaldivar, & Tomlinson, 
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2010) and 500,000 individuals (Guarino, 2016) who can complete HITs at any one time. The service has 
been widely adopted in practice with more than 865,000 active HITs available in January, 2017. Research 
regarding the service has revealed that Mechanical Turk workers live in a wide variety of locations and 
represent a broad range of demographic characteristics. Ross et al. (2010) estimated that 57 percent of 
Mechanical Turk workers live in the United States, 32 percent in India, and three percent in Canada. They 
estimated that the remaining eight percent of workers live in a diverse set of countries that range from 
Australia to Nigeria. Further, they found that the average worker age is 31 years old, that 60 percent of 
workers hold a college degree, that 38 percent work full-time outside of Mechanical Turk, that 31 percent 
are unemployed, that 33 percent are either a full or part-time student, that 27 percent have annual income 
below US$10,000, and that 14 percent have an annual income above US$70,000.   
Aguinis and Lawal (2012) called Mechanical Turk “an ideal environment to conduct experiments because 
researchers are able to use real people and real tasks in a controlled environment” (pp. 437). Cheung, 
Burns, Sinclair and Sliter (2017) subsequently compiled a list of potential validity threats when using 
Mechanical Turk for research purposes and a set of recommended practices to remediate those threats. 
Casler, Bickel, and Hackett (2013) compared research responses collected using Mechanical Turk to data 
collected face to face in a research lab and found no significant differences in the average values of 
responses.   
To collect data for this study, we posted a link to our survey instrument as a HIT on Amazon Turk and 
offered US$0.50 to the first 650 workers who completed the survey. We chose 650 as a target sample size 
because a power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) indicated that we 
needed 647 responses to detect small Cohen’s f2 effect sizes (Rice & Harris, 2005) using our research 
model. After cleaning the data and eliminating incomplete surveys, we obtained 644 valid reactions (just 
shy of the recommended 647 responses). 
4.3 Data Analysis and Results 
We collected 685 responses to our survey. However, on the day that we posted the HIT, the server that 
hosted our instrument experienced intermittent connectivity issues. This resulted in several partially 
complete responses, which we dropped from the sample. Further, following Cheung et al.’s (2017) 
recommendations, we dropped responses that had indicators of respondent inattentiveness. We used the 
remaining644 responses for our analysis.  
The usable responses came from a highly diverse range of individuals. The youngest respondent was 18, 
and the oldest was 84. The average age was 34.8 years. Further, 58 percent of our respondents were male, 
43 percent were married, 58 percent had children, and 70 percent indicated that they worked full-time. The 
respondents identified as White/Caucasian (68%) followed by Asian (17%), Black/African American (7%), 
Hispanic (6%), and other (2%).  
The respondents represented a diverse collection of geographical locations. We collected responses from 
individuals who lived in 38 different countries and six different continents. With that said, most respondents 
lived in the US (78%) and represented 48 of its 50 states. The second highest number of respondents lived 
in India (11% of the sample) and the third highest lived in Venezuela (2%). The final nine percent 
represented 35 different countries. We believe that our sample contained a high number of respondents 
who lived in the US partly due to our posting our HIT at approximately 10:00 a.m. Central Time the US and 
Canada. Ross et al. (2010) show that staggering the posting time of HITs results in broader diversity in the 
geographical location of respondent workers.  
We analyzed the collected data using the R language package PLSPM, a partial least squares (PLS) 
approach for studying complex models based on relationships between sets of latent variables (Chin, 1998). 
Researchers have shown PLS to: 1) work with both small and large sample sizes, 2) work effectively with 
both interval and ratio scales, and 3) make minimal demands on residual distributions. The method relies 
on bootstrap resampling as a non-parametric means of drawing inferences from the provided sample. 
Accordingly, skewed data does not affect the PLSPM model estimates’ precision (Vilares, Almeida, & 
Coelho, 2010).  
4.4 Measure Validation 
For analysis purposes, we modeled all items as reflective indicators of the proposed latent constructs. We 
then followed the two-step structural equation modeling approach that Anderson and Gerbing (1988) 
recommend by first assessing the measurement model’s suitability and then evaluating its veracity.  
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We also assessed the measurement model’s convergent validity, discriminate validity, and construct 
reliability. To evaluate its convergent validity, we followed the procedure that Gefen, Rigdon, and Straub 
(2011) outline and examined the “on-factor” loadings. In doing so, we found that four of the distrust indicators 
did not load significantly on that construct. Consequently, we dropped those indicators from the model and 
re-ran the analysis without them. Subsequently, we found that all of the remaining indicators loaded strongly 
on the modeled construct and all but two of the “on-factor” loadings exceeded 0.70 (see Appendix B). The 
indicators with loadings below 0.70 were for the RSK2 (risk propensity) and SLF1 (self-efficacy), which had 
loadings levels of 0.65 and 0.60, respectively. As these loadings were just below the recommended 
threshold of 0.70, we decided to run our model a second time without the two low-loading items included. 
However, we found no significant differences in beta coefficients, R squared values, reliability coefficients 
or AVE values between the two models. Since the two items’ loadings were just below the recommended 
threshold and prior research had validated them, we decided to retain the two items in our model and 
concluded that our measurement model exhibited an acceptable level of convergent validity. 
Next, we examined each indicator’s cross loadings to assess the measurement model’s discriminate validity. 
We found no “off-factor” loadings within 0.20 of the “on-factor” loadings for all constructs other than avoidance 
motivation and avoidance behavior. While indicators for those constructs had high cross loadings with each 
other, we do not believe that it indicates that a problem exists since these constructs have a long and proven 
record of validity. One must assess indicator loadings with regard to the theorized relationship between the 
constructs. Both the original TTAT model and our proposed extension assert that avoidance motivation is an 
antecedent to avoidance behavior. We expected the constructs and their associated indicators to be highly 
related. To further substantiate the measurement model’s discriminant validity, we calculated the square root 
of the average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct and checked to ensure that it was higher than the 
construct’s correlations with all other constructs as Table 2 shows. We concluded that our model exhibited an 
acceptable level of the discriminate validity. We assessed construct reliability using Cronbach’s coefficient 
alpha (Wilkinson, 1999). Table 2 includes these coefficients and shows that Cronbach’s alpha was above 0.70 
for all of the latent constructs, which indicates that, for this particular population of participants, our scales also 
exhibited an acceptable level of reliability. 
Before assessing the structural model’s veracity, we employed Harman’s (1976) single-factor technique to 
test for the presence of common method bias. First, we used the fa command in the R pysch package to 
generate a minimum residual, unrotated factor solution for the 58 indicators in our model. We then inspected 
the resulting Eigenvalues and scree plot. The unconstrained solution listed eight components with 
Eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and the Eigenvalue for the ninth component was just under the 1.0 threshold. 
Cumulatively, those components accounted for 70.56 percent of the variance in the sample. Next, we 
inspected the scree plot and found two elbows in the graph. The first elbow occurred after the sixth 
component and the second elbow occurred after the ninth component. Both the Eigenvalues and scree plot 
indicated that a multifactor solution was appropriate for the collected data. Finally, we re-ran the factor 
analysis but restricted the output to a single component solution. The single component had an Eigenvalue 
of 14.39 but accounted for only 22.5 percent of the variance in the sample. Based on these results, we 
concluded that biases due to common method variance do not present a significant concern for the sample. 
Table 1. Construct Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Name α AVE SEV SUS RSK DIST THR EFF CST SEF IMP MOT BEH 
SEV 0.94 0.66 0.81           
SUS 0.92 0.82 0.36*** 0.76          
RSK 0.86 0.59 -0.13*** 0.10** 0.76         
DIST 0.89 0.68 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.82        
THR 0.85 0.62 0.68*** 0.38*** -0.20*** 0.19*** 0.79       
EFF 0.93 0.74 0.61*** 0.26*** -0.21*** 0.10* 0.64*** 0.86      
CST 0.87 0.79 -0.38*** 0.08+ 0.46*** 0.11** -0.27*** -0.41*** 0.89     
SEF 0.92 0.58 0.22*** -0.07+ 0.01 0.04 0.21*** 0.30*** -0.14*** 0.76    
IMP 0.84 0.67 -0.21*** 0.14** 0.57*** 0.34*** -0.18*** -0.19*** 0.47*** -0.09* 0.82   
MOT 0.93 0.87 0.42*** 0.19*** -0.16*** 0.02 0.47*** 0.62*** -0.50*** 0.22*** -0.19*** 0.93  
BEH 0.89 0.90 0.34*** 0.15*** -0.08+ 0.01 0.36*** 0.52*** -0.47*** 0.18*** -0.14*** 0.82*** 0.95 
Based on standardized values.  Diagonal elements represent the square root of the AVE values  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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5 Results 
Finally, to assess the proposed model, we inspected path coefficients and R2 values of for each construct. 
Figure 4 shows β coefficients, associated ρ-values, and R2 values for each dependent variable included in 
the model. The model accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in perceived severity (R2 = .14), 
perceived threat (R2 = .48), avoidance motivation (R2 = .48) and avoidance behavior (R2 = .67). 
 
Figure 4. Model Results 
On inspecting the model beta coefficient estimates, we found strong support for all but one of our 
hypothesized relations. Perceived susceptibility had a significant and positive direct effect on perceived 
severity (β = .37, ρ < 0.001). To assess whether or not perceived severity partially mediated the influence 
of perceived susceptibility on threat perceptions, we applied Baron and Kenny’s (1986) four-step approach 
to test for the presence of mediation. First, we conducted simple regression tests to confirm that perceived 
susceptibility was significantly associated with perceived severity (β = .25, ρ < 0.001) and that perceived 
severity was significantly associated with perceived threat (β = .68, ρ < 0.001). Finally, we conducted 
multiple regression to confirm that both the direct path from perceived susceptibility to perceived threat (β = 
.18, ρ < 0.001) and indirect path from perceived susceptibility to perceived threat (β = .37, ρ < 0.001) were 
both significant. 
Accordingly, we found support for our proposal that perceived severity partially mediates the influence of 
perceived susceptibility on perceived threat. Next, we conducted the Sobel test (Preacher & Leonardelli, 
2001) to confirm that the mediation effect was statistically significant (t = 9.33, ρ < 0.002). Accordingly, our 
results support H1a, H1b and H1c.  
We then assessed the beta coefficients and significance values for the other latent constructs in the original 
TTAT model. Perceived threat was significantly associated with avoidance motivation (β = .12, ρ < 0.01) as 
were safeguard effectiveness (β = .41, ρ < 0.001) and safeguard cost (β = -.33, ρ < 0.001). However, self-
efficacy was not significantly associated with avoidance motivation (β = .03, ρ < 0.28). Accordingly, we found 
support for H2, H3 and H4 but not for H5. Finally, avoidance motivation was highly associated with 
avoidance behavior (β = .82, ρ < 0.001), which supports H6. 
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In terms of the individual differences constructs that we added to the TTAT model, risk propensity was 
negatively and significantly associated with threat perceptions (β = -.14, ρ < 0.001), which supports H7. 
Distrust propensity was positively and significantly associated with threat perceptions (β = .10, ρ < 0.001), 
which supports H8. Finally, impulsivity was significantly associated with avoidance motivation (β = .06, ρ < 
0.05); however, the direction of the influence was opposite to what we hypothesized. Thus, we did not find 
support for H9. 
As a final step, we followed the procedures that Cohen (1988) notes to calculate the f2 effect size that each 
independent variable has on its associated dependent variable. The general guidelines for interpretation of 
the f2 statistic specify that values greater than or equal to .02 represents a small effect, values greater than 
or equal to .15 represents a medium effect, and values greater than or equal to .35 represent a large effect. 
Our analysis indicated that perceived susceptibility had a medium sized effect on perceived severity (f2 = 
.155) and a small effect on perceived threat (f2 = .054). In addition, perceived severity had a large effect on 
perceived threat (f 2 = .370), while both risk propensity (f2 = .046) and distrust propensity (f2 = .016) both 
had a small effect on perceived threat. In terms of avoidance motivation, safeguard effectiveness had a 
medium effect (f2 = .163), safeguard cost had a small effect (f2 = .118) and threat perceptions had a small 
effect (f2 = .016). Both self-efficacy (f2 = .002) and impulsivity (f2 = .007) had only a negligible effect on 
avoidance motivation. Finally, avoidance motivation had a large effect on avoidance behavior (f2 = 2.036). 
6 Discussion 
Our findings continue to echo Liang and Xue’s (2010) original findings and the findings that Young et al. 
(2016) report in their replication study. For example, perceived susceptibility predicted perceived threat and 
perceived severity even more vigorously predicted perceived threat. The empirical results supported our 
decision to examine risk propensity and distrust propensity as potential antecedents to perceived threat. 
Both constructs were significant and substantially improved the overall R2 value obtained in the analysis. 
Respondents with a higher penchant toward risk propensity showed a reduced level of threat perception. In 
addition, higher distrust propensity predicted increases in perceived threat. These results highlight how 
individual differences enhance or diminish the perceived severity of threats. Armed with this type of 
information, organizational leaders could look to identify certain traits among their IT users and initiate 
training plans to mitigate counterproductive technology threat assessments. We discuss this point in greater 
detail in Section 6.2.  
Contrary to our original hypothesis, we also found that increased levels of impulsivity caused a small but 
significant increase in avoidance motivation. Given our moderately large sample size, one should interpret 
the .047 p-value with care. Depending on the underlying impetus for the impulsive motivation to act, the 
results could suggest that impulsivity is either functional or dysfunctional in this particular model. Functional 
impulsivity might spur a highly competent subject to action, while dysfunctional impulsivity might lead to 
action when the subject has insufficient skill or has given the action insufficient forethought. More research 
needs to determine whether the effects of impulsivity are functional or dysfunctional in the extant model. 
Overall, the results of the expanded model effectively account for a substantially larger percentage of the 
variance in avoidance behavior compared to any previous study. We achieved this result using a large, 
demographically diverse sample relative to past TTAT replication studies. Moreover, the depth and breadth 
of the data allows one to interpret and apply the results across organization type and geography. Self-
efficacy was insignificant in our study, which raises concerns about this measure’s continued use. Due to 
inconsistencies across multiple studies, we scrutinized the self-efficacy items and believe this construct 
requires revision to provide a clearer focus on security-specific forms of self-efficacy to be relevant in this 
domain. 
6.1 Contributions 
This paper makes several contributions to TTAT theory and has implications for security practitioners. First, 
we put forth a potential explanation for why prior TTAT empirical tests have yielded mixed results—
particularly in terms of the influence of susceptibility and severity on threat perceptions. Additionally, we 
provide an alternative model that we believe provides better explanatory value of the threat-assessment 
process. In addition, we extend the TTAT model to account for individual differences that influence threat 
perceptions, avoidance motivation levels, and behavior. We tested our proposed model using a large sample 
that we collected from a set of highly heterogeneous individuals, which reinforces the theory’s generalizability. 
Our results lend support for TTAT’s generalizability. Finally, we mindfully chose our sample size to ensure that 
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we achieved significant statistic power to detect small Cohen effect sizes, which ensures that we robustly 
tested the influence of each construct in our revised TTAT model (Cohen, 1992). 
In terms of practice, our findings provide several insights concerning how avoidance motivation decisions 
occur. Security practitioners can use this information to craft policies, messages, and education programs 
to enhance individuals’ motivations to behave more securely. Our first insight concerns messaging regarding 
safeguard effectiveness. An individual’s belief in the effectiveness of a security safeguard plays a key 
motivating role in whether the individual adopts the safeguard. In fact, both we and Liang and Xue (2010) 
found that safeguard effectiveness had the largest positive influence on avoidance motivation. Accordingly, 
we believe that security practitioners must do a better job at marketing the effectiveness of security 
measures to their constituents. Security policies and messages should not only state how users should 
behavior but also explain the efficacy and importance of the recommended safeguard measures.     
Our second key insight concerns improving individuals’ beliefs regarding their ability to implement and use 
security safeguards. Liang and Xue (2010) found support for a positive association between one’s beliefs 
about one’s ability to implement a security safeguard and avoidance motivation, which makes perfect sense 
since individuals will be motivated to do something if the feel confident in their ability to do so. However, in 
our sample, we did not find support for a significant association between such beliefs and our respondents’ 
motivation to install and use security software to avoid malware. This difference is unsettling because it 
indicates that, in our sample, individuals who felt confident in their ability to use security software had no 
more motivation to install and use it than individuals who lacked confidence in their abilities. The difference 
between Liang and Xue’s (2010) results and ours may actually have resulted from time and changes in the 
security landscape. Since 2010, numerous major security compromises have occurred, and the media has 
widely discussed several new types of security exploits. As such, competent individuals may lack motivation 
use security software because they do not feel that their actions really matter. Security practitioners must 
face this challenge head on and first make sure that the safeguards they design are simple and 
straightforward to use so that all users feel more confident in their abilities. Additionally, as we mention 
above, security practitioners must clearly explain the effectiveness of the proposed safeguard and the 
impact that adoption and use have on the broader security landscape.   
Our next key insight involves the influence of risk propensity and impulsivity in individual’s security 
avoidance decisions. In our sample, increased risk propensity was associated with a reduced level of threat 
perception and heightened impulsivity was associated with an increase in avoidance motivation. As such, 
security practitioners need to ensure that constituents appreciate the numerous threats present and 
motivate them to behave in a secure fashion. To aid in this endeavor, companies could measure employees’ 
risk propensity and impulsivity levels and use the results to customize security messages and training 
specifically for individuals with specific levels of risk propensity and impulsivity. 
Finally, our last key insight concerns reducing individuals’ perceptions about the level of effort they need to 
implement security safeguards. In both our and Liang and Xue’s (2010) models, the effort cost associated 
with implementing a security safeguard was negatively associated with implementing the target safeguard. 
This finding is logical and straightforward. Individuals will not have motivation to behave in a secure manner 
if they perceive the target behavior as too challenging or strenuous. Again, this finding indicates that security 
professionals must ensure that all recommended safeguards are easy and straightforward for users to 
implement and use. We believe that cyber security technology vendors and policy writers can use these 
insights concerning safeguard effectiveness, self-efficacy, risk propensity, impulsivity, and effort cost to 
develop products, processes, and messages that more effectively encourage avoidance behavior.    
6.2 Limitations and Future Research 
As with all research, one needs to interpret our findings while considering the limitations of the study design 
and the research method we employed. While we strove to gather the data for this study from a highly 
heterogeneous, large sample of respondents, we acknowledge that problems could exist with using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk as the sole basis for our sample frame. The system is still relatively new, and Amazon 
Mechanical Turk workers could possibly systemically differ from other groups of Internet users regarding 
security concerns. Accordingly, future research efforts should test the refined TTAT model in other domains 
and industries in order to control for any potential biases that arise from our using Amazon Mechanical Turk 
for our sampling system.  
We also acknowledge that we collected all of the constructs assessed in our study using self-reported 
measures. Prior research has shown that differences often exist between self-reported measures and actual 
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values. Accordingly, we note that our proposed refinement of TTAT builds on individuals’ perceptions of 
cyber security motivations and behavior rather than their actual motivations and behaviors. Additionally, we 
note that we made several changes to Liang and Xue’s (2010) TTAT instrument in order to improve the 
clarity of our survey questions. These changes included modifying the TTAT items’ wording to better fit the 
malware context, making scaling changes so that we consistently used a seven-point Likert scale throughout 
the instrument, and dropping one of the perceived susceptibility items that prior TTAT studies have used. 
While we feel confident that our measures exhibited adequate levels of reliability and validity to support our 
findings, these instrument changes could have resulted in slightly different interpretations of the TTAT 
constructs. Finally, we must note that we did not provide a specific definition of malware in the survey 
instructions, which we acknowledge may have resulted in respondents’ applying differing interpretations 
when completing the survey and, thus, affected our results. Additionally, although a power analysis indicated 
that we needed 647 responses to detect small Cohen’s f2 effect sizes (Rice & Harris, 2005) with our 
research model, we ended up with only 644 valid survey responses. Our slightly smaller than recommended 
sample has only one practical effect: that one could question our finding regarding self-efficacy being a non-
significant predictor of avoidance behavior. However, given that our results with a sample size of 644 
responses did not approach significance, it seems unlikely that the results would have changed with a small 
number of additional responses. Our sample size limitation may have been more important if more 
insignificant findings existed or if the single non-significant relationship had approached significance.    
One opportunity to extend the TTAT literature involves enhancing measurement of the core TTAT 
constructs. Several individual items in the original Liang and Xue (2010) instrument assess multiple 
disparate constructs, which makes the meaning of the respondent’s answer unclear. For example, for our 
study, we adopted Liang and Xue’s item “I don’t have anti-spyware on my PC because I don’t know how to 
get an anti-spyware software” and revised it to “I don’t have security software on my PC because I don’t 
know how to get it”. Both these items individually ask two different and distinct questions (i.e., 1) do you 
have threat-mitigating software on your PC and 2) do you know how to get threat-mitigating software), which 
respondents may find confusing. Accordingly, we recommend that future researchers carefully examine the 
text of all TTAT items in order to clarify their meaning. Additionally, Liang and Xue’s (2010) instrument uses 
10 items to measure several of the core constructs. We believe this high number of questions may contribute 
to survey exhaustion and result in some respondents dropping out of the survey before completion. 
Accordingly, researchers should develop a more parsimonious yet robust TTAT instrument.   
We did not find support for the hypothesis about the influence of self-efficacy on avoidance motivation. While 
this result concurs with what previous researchers have found, the strong theoretical basis for self-efficacy 
as a predictor of IT behaviors begs for additional exploration regarding this relationship. In conducting such 
an exploration, one may need to carefully examine each self-efficacy item to determine its suitability in the 
specific context of the particular study. Additionally, note that one of the self-efficacy items loaded slightly 
below the 0.70 level and another item loaded just at 0.70, which further indicates that efforts to explore the 
self-efficacy/avoidance motivation relationship should focus on improving measurement of the self-efficacy 
construct.  
Finally, researchers need to conduct supplemental work to fully understand the relationship between 
impulsivity and avoidance motivation. While we found support for an association, the influence was in the 
opposite direction of our original hypothesis. This finding means that, for our sample, more impulsive 
individuals had more motivation to avoid malware threats. We note that the impulsivity scales that TTAT 
studies most commonly use do not distinguish between functional and dysfunctional impulsivity as 
researchers commonly model in the psychology literature (Jones & Paulhus, 2011), which may cause 
counteracting influences where the two types of impulsivity have opposite effects and reduce the 
significance when modeled as a single variable. Note that the significance of the association was 0.047, 
close to the 0.05 level commonly used to assess statistical significance. Accordingly, we need a robust 
replication to shed light on this relationship. 
7 Conclusion 
Our refining the technology threat avoidance theory yielded positive results—particularly in the area of 
resolving the susceptibility, severity, and threat inconsistencies in previous work.  Support for the theory in 
general coupled with construct refinement and validation of improved items provides an interesting story. 
The continued failure of general self-efficacy measures strongly indicates the need to develop a technology-
based self-efficacy scale more suitable for use in the technology threat behavior domain. This exploration 
may require one to carefully examine each self-efficacy item. Overall, our study provides substantial insights 
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and refinement to the theory base on threat avoidance behavior. We believe these refinements will benefit 
future research and provide practitioners with better tools to elicit compliance with security policies and best 
practices. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Instrument 
Construct Indicator Indicator text 
Perceived 
susceptibility 
SUS1 It is extremely likely that my computer will contain malware in the future. 
SUS2 The chances of getting malware on my system are great. 
SUS3 There is a good possibility that my computer will contain malware at some point. 
SUS4 There is a good chance that there will be malware on my computer at some point in the future. 
Perceived 
severity 
SEV1 Malware could steal personal information from my computer without my knowledge. 
SEV2 Malware could invade my privacy. 
SEV3 My personal information collected by malware could be misused by cyber criminals. 
SEV4 Malware could record my Internet activities and send it to unknown parties. 
SEV5 My personal information collected by malware could be subjected to unauthorized secondary use. 
SEV6 My personal information collected by malware could be used to commit crimes against me. 
SEV7 Malware could slow down my Internet connection. 
SEV8 Malware could make my computer run more slowly. 
SEV9 Malware could cause my systems to crash from time to time. 
SEV10 Malware could affect some of my computer programs and make them difficult to use. 
Perceived 
threat 
THR1 Malware poses a threat to me. 
THR2 The consequences of getting malware on my computer threaten me. 
THR3 Malware is a danger to my computer. 
THR4 It would be dreadful if my computer was infected by malware. 
THR5 It would be risky to use my computer if it had malware. 
Perceived 
effectiveness 
EFF1 Computer security software would be useful for detecting and removing malware. 
EFF2 Computer security software would increase my ability to protect my computer from malware. 
EFF3 Computer security software would enable me to search and remove malware on my computer faster. 
EFF4 Computer security software would enhance my effectiveness in finding and removing malware on my computer. 
EFF5 Computer security software would make it easier to search for and remove malware on my computer. 
EFF6 Computer security software would increase my productivity in searching and removing malware on my computer. 
Safeguard 
cost 
CST1 I don't have security software on my computer because I don't know how to get it. 
CST2 I don't have security software on my computer because it may cause problems with other programs on my computer 
CST3 I don't have security software on my computer because installing it is too much trouble. 
Self-efficacy 
SEF1 I could successfully install and use computer security software if there was no one around to tell me what to do. 
SEF2 I could successfully install and use computer security software if I had never used a package like it before. 
SEF3 I could successfully install and use computer security software if I only had the software manuals for reference. 
SEF4 I could successfully install and use computer security software if I had seen someone else do it before trying myself. 
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Table A1. Instrument 
SEF5 I could successfully install and use computer security software if I could call someone for help if I got stuck. 
SEF6 I could successfully install and use computer security software if someone helped me get started. 
SEF7 I could successfully install and use computer security software if I had a lot of time to complete the task. 
SEF8 I could successfully install and use computer security software if I only had the built-in help facility for assistance. 
SEF9 I could successfully install and use computer security software if someone showed me how to do it first. 
SEF10 I could successfully install and use computer security software if I had used a similar package before. 
Avoidance 
motivation 
MOT1 I intend to use computer security software to avoid malware breaches. 
MOT2 I use computer security software to avoid malware breaches. 
MOT3 I plan to use computer security software to avoid malware. 
Avoidance 
behavior 
BEH1 I run computer security software regularly to remove malware from my computer. 
BEH2 I update my computer security software regularly. 
Risk 
propensity 
RSK1 I engage in risky recreational activities (e.g., rock-climbing, scuba diving) 
RSK2 I engage in risky health related behaviors (e.g., smoking, poor diet, high alcohol consumption) 
RSK3 I engage in risky career related behaviors (e.g., quitting a job without another to go to) 
RSK4 I take safety risks (e.g., fast driving, cycling without a helmet) 
RSK5 I take financial risks (e.g., gambling, risky investments) 
RSK6 I take social risks (e.g., standing for election, publicly challenging rules or decisions) 
Impulsivity 
IMP1 I often act on the spur of the moment without stopping to think. 
IMP2 I don't devote much thought and effort to preparing for the future. 
IMP3 I often do whatever brings me pleasure here and now, even at the cost of distant goals. 
IMP4 I'm more concerned with what happens to me in the short run than in the long run. 
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Table A2. Factor Loadings 
 SUS SEV RSK DIST THR EFF COS SEF IMP MOT BEH 
SUS1 0.92 0.30 0.10 0.13 0.33 0.22 0.06 -0.08 0.11 0.17 0.14 
SUS2 0.87 0.28 0.12 0.14 0.34 0.20 0.13 -0.07 0.17 0.13 0.10 
SUS3 0.90 0.39 0.05 0.13 0.36 0.28 0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.23 0.19 
SUS4 0.92 0.36 0.07 0.12 0.36 0.27 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.18 0.15 
SEV1 0.33 -0.83 0.10 0.17 0.57 0.52 0.27 -0.20 0.14 0.36 0.28 
SEV2 0.29 -0.86 0.14 0.21 0.63 0.56 0.34 -0.24 0.20 0.39 0.30 
SEV3 0.30 -0.85 0.10 0.19 0.59 0.53 0.31 -0.21 0.16 0.39 0.31 
SEV4 0.29 -0.82 0.10 0.16 0.53 0.48 0.31 -0.25 0.16 0.33 0.28 
SEV5 0.32 -0.86 0.14 0.16 0.58 0.53 0.35 -0.18 0.18 0.35 0.28 
SEV6 0.29 -0.77 0.09 0.16 0.54 0.44 0.26 -0.18 0.16 0.29 0.25 
SEV7 0.29 -0.76 0.08 0.11 0.50 0.46 0.30 -0.14 0.18 0.33 0.29 
SEV8 0.28 -0.80 0.15 0.19 0.52 0.52 0.35 -0.17 0.20 0.37 0.30 
SEV9 0.32 -0.76 0.11 0.11 0.50 0.42 0.24 -0.15 0.18 0.29 0.23 
SEV10 0.31 -0.82 0.16 0.17 0.53 0.49 0.33 -0.18 0.20 0.34 0.26 
RSK1 -0.07 0.17 0.83 -0.12 -0.20 0.22 0.42 0.00 -0.47 -0.15 0.04 
RSK2 -0.05 0.03 0.65 -0.14 -0.10 0.07 0.26 0.06 -0.44 -0.03 0.00 
RSK3 -0.08 0.10 0.77 -0.17 -0.17 0.18 0.35 -0.04 -0.47 -0.17 0.12 
RSK4 -0.11 0.07 0.74 -0.17 -0.11 0.12 0.35 -0.05 -0.48 -0.14 0.11 
RSK5 -0.07 0.14 0.80 -0.12 -0.20 0.19 0.40 -0.04 -0.46 -0.12 0.06 
RSK6 -0.05 0.09 0.77 -0.09 -0.14 0.19 0.34 0.03 -0.35 -0.14 0.03 
DIST1 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.85 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.26 0.03 0.02 
DIST2 0.11 0.09 0.19 0.81 0.12 0.00 0.18 0.04 -0.31 -0.08 0.08 
DIST3 0.12 0.08 0.19 0.78 0.11 0.00 0.16 0.00 -0.35 -0.03 0.03 
DIST4 0.09 0.18 0.13 0.84 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.28 -0.03 0.00 
DIST5 0.13 0.25 0.09 0.85 0.28 0.22 0.01 0.05 0.17 0.14 0.11 
THR1 0.40 -0.53 0.12 0.19 0.83 0.48 0.21 -0.13 0.15 0.42 0.31 
THR2 0.38 -0.52 0.12 0.16 0.80 0.50 0.14 -0.16 0.10 0.31 0.24 
THR3 0.33 -0.59 0.17 0.20 0.81 0.56 0.26 -0.19 0.19 0.41 0.31 
THR4 0.24 -0.46 0.22 0.16 0.75 0.51 0.22 -0.14 0.15 0.38 0.28 
THR5 0.18 -0.57 0.20 0.13 0.76 0.50 0.22 -0.25 0.18 0.34 0.27 
EFF1 0.19 -0.50 0.21 0.12 0.54 0.87 0.36 -0.28 0.15 0.55 0.47 
EFF2 0.27 -0.54 0.18 0.15 0.57 0.86 0.35 -0.30 0.16 0.56 0.46 
EFF3 0.23 -0.54 0.19 0.11 0.56 0.85 0.33 -0.24 0.20 0.52 0.45 
EFF4 0.24 -0.52 0.24 0.11 0.58 0.85 0.41 -0.26 0.19 0.60 0.50 
EFF5 0.23 -0.53 0.15 0.13 0.55 0.87 0.36 -0.29 0.18 0.51 0.45 
EFF6 0.24 -0.51 0.18 0.06 0.52 0.84 0.30 -0.24 0.15 0.46 0.38 
CST1 -0.07 0.36 0.40 -0.06 -0.25 0.32 0.86 -0.11 -0.42 -0.39 0.38 
CST2 -0.04 0.31 0.41 -0.10 -0.21 0.39 0.89 -0.12 -0.43 -0.48 0.43 
CST3 -0.04 0.35 0.44 -0.08 -0.26 0.38 0.91 -0.16 -0.43 -0.45 0.45 
SLF1 0.07 0.18 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.18 0.08 -0.69 0.04 0.15 0.15 
SLF3 0.08 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.22 0.09 -0.73 0.04 0.13 0.11 
SLF4 0.08 -0.13 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.22 0.11 -0.85 0.07 0.16 0.12 
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Table A2. Factor Loadings 
SLF5 0.03 -0.21 0.07 0.02 0.21 0.32 0.16 -0.79 0.13 0.21 0.18 
SLF6 0.03 -0.12 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.22 0.10 -0.80 0.06 0.14 0.10 
SLF7 0.02 -0.16 0.01 0.06 0.18 0.24 0.10 -0.75 0.09 0.19 0.12 
SLF8 0.02 0.19 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.24 0.11 -0.73 0.07 0.16 0.17 
SLF9 0.08 -0.11 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.19 0.09 -0.82 0.09 0.16 0.10 
SLF10 0.03 -0.30 0.08 0.06 0.27 0.35 0.21 -0.78 0.15 0.28 0.22 
IMP1 -0.14 0.17 0.57 -0.26 -0.16 0.16 0.42 -0.13 -0.86 -0.19 0.12 
IMP2 -0.06 0.22 0.41 -0.19 -0.19 0.19 0.41 -0.04 -0.80 -0.17 0.14 
IMP3 -0.06 0.16 0.47 -0.30 -0.17 0.17 0.38 -0.11 -0.85 -0.17 0.13 
IMP4 -0.11 0.14 0.41 -0.29 -0.08 0.08 0.34 -0.04 -0.75 -0.08 0.07 
MOT1 0.21 -0.39 0.15 0.03 0.45 0.59 0.45 -0.23 0.19 0.95 0.75 
MOT2 0.16 -0.38 0.14 0.05 0.40 0.56 0.49 -0.18 0.18 0.92 0.82 
MOT3 0.19 -0.41 0.18 0.06 0.47 0.60 0.46 -0.24 0.20 0.94 0.72 
BEH1 0.17 -0.33 0.09 0.02 0.35 0.52 0.45 -0.18 0.15 0.78 0.95 
BEH2 0.13 -0.32 0.06 0.03 0.33 0.48 0.44 -0.17 0.13 0.78 0.94 
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